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2China’s Exchange Rate Policy: The Case For Greater Flexibility
Abstract
Since the Asian crisis, the merit of the Chinese government’s de facto peg to the US
dollar has been the subject of widening debate.  This paper reviews the issues
surrounding China’s currency regime choice and assesses the case for greater flexibility.
Reform era exchange rate policies are examined along with the performance of the
economy during and since the Asian crisis.  In the Chinese context the arguments for and
against fixed exchange rates are then explained and assessed.  Finally, an elemental
comparative static macroeconomic model is used to examine the implications of domestic
and external shocks under different exchange rate regimes and with differing degrees of
capital mobility.  The results support the view that more flexibility would be beneficial to
China and that this benefit can be expected to increase as capital mobility increases.
1.  Introduction
Over the past two years Chinese authorities have met with pressure from the IMF
to adopt a more flexible regime for the renminbi (RMB).1  Despite the government’s
apparent decision to maintain its de facto peg to the dollar at least in the short term, the
optimality of this policy is increasingly being questioned both at home and abroad
(Zhang and Shen, 2000; Yang and Tyers, 2000).  While the People’s Bank of China
(PBC) has stressed repeatedly that the RMB shall remain stable, China has no official
exchange rate target and classifies its currency regime as a ‘managed float’.
Policymakers thus have considerable leeway in their management of China’s currency
and are not committed to maintaining the peg indefinitely. 2  Indeed, the stabilisation of
the East Asian region  that has occurred since the currency crisis suggests that the time
may be ripe for a fundamental change in China’s exchange rate policy.
In this paper we take stock of the issues surrounding China’s currency regime
choice and assess the case for greater flexibility.  Section 2 reviews China’s reform era
exchange rate policy and the economy’s performance under a pegged exchange rate
                                                
1 The Australian Financial Review (AFR), 27 June 2000; IMF, 2001b.
2 The PBC has affirmed that it will work towards enhancing the flexibility of the RMB after China’s WTO
entry, but that the currency will remain ‘stable’ for another five years (see reports on the government
website at http://ce.cei.gov.cn). While the currency has been allowed to trade outside its narrow range of
Y8.277/US$ to Y8.280/US$ more than seventy times over the past fifteen months (although only twice
outside the weak end), the band has been maintained quite strictly since the crisis.
3during and since the Asian crisis.  Section 3 discusses the arguments for and against fixed
exchange rates, focusing on the nominal anchor argument.  Section 4 assesses these
arguments in the Chinese context, paying particular attention to the implications a
nominal peg will have for macroeconomic adjustment as China’s capital markets become
globally integrated.  In Section 5 a simple comparative static model of the Chinese
economy is described and, in Section 6, model simulations are presented for several
external and domestic shocks under varying degrees of capital mobility. The simulation
experiments support the idea that China might benefit from a flexible currency regime,
and that the case for flexible exchange rates will strengthen as capital mobility increases.
Section 7 investigates possible extensions of the foregoing analysis and, finally, Section 8
offers conclusions.
2.  Background
Between 1981 and 1986 the RMB was pegged to a basket of internationally
traded currencies weighted according to their importance in China’s external transactions.
Since then, although the authorities have classified the currency regime as a ‘managed
float’, in reality exchange rate policy has not been uniform.  From 1986 to 1994 three
different rates were effective at the same time: the ‘official’ rate (an oft-adjusted peg to
the US dollar); ‘swap’ market rates (unofficial floating rates which the central bank
occasionally adjusted through market intervention); and the ‘effective’ exchange rates
actually faced by exporters (weighted averages of official and unofficial rates).3  The
apparent overvaluation of the official exchange rate during the 1980s, at least relative to
the market-based exchange rates, was a source of concern to policymakers who
recognised it as a tax on exporters.  Committed to improving the trade balance, the
authorities intervened in the swap market and, from 1989, repeatedly devalued the
official rate, eventually unifying the official and swap market exchange rates at the
prevailing swap rate in 1994.
The hallmark of exchange rate policy in the 1990s was the authorities’ adherence
to a ‘real targets’ approach (described by Corden, 1993), whereby the exchange rate was
                                                
3 This arrangement of multiple exchange rates was a by-product of the foreign exchange retention quota
system (see Mehran, et al.  1996).
4targeted at the ‘domestic cost of earning a unit of foreign exchange through exporting’.4
However, the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997 compelled the authorities to abandon this
approach in favour of a rigid peg to the US dollar, a policy that has persisted to the
present.
China’s performance during the Asian currency crisis has been well documented
(Song, 1998, Fernald and Babson, 2000; Yang and Tyers; 2000).  Initially to protect
Hong Kong’s currency board, the Chinese leadership responded by fixing nominal parity
with the US dollar in 1997.  Growing regional instability compelled the authorities to
persevere with the peg, however, and China’s decision not to devalue was widely
applauded at the time for preventing a further round of competitive devaluations.5  In
fact, substantial foreign exchange reserves, combined with capital controls that had
prevented excessive short-term external debt accumulation and a ban on futures trading in
the RMB, shielded China from the worst effects of the crisis and could possibly have
done so even with a devaluation in 1998.
As it was, the economy did not escape the Asian crisis unscathed.  Between 1997
and 1998 unsanctioned outflows on the capital account nearly doubled despite the capital
controls, reflecting a rise in perceived ‘country risk’.6  Foreign direct investment (FDI)
declined, and the real exchange rate appreciated relative to China’s neighbours, damaging
export competitiveness.7  At the same time, widespread layoffs resulting from state-
owned enterprise (SOE) reforms contributed to rising unemployment, which, combined
with other reforms reducing the state provision of welfare services, encouraged
households to substitute saving for consumption. 8  Falling export growth and FDI on one
hand, and a rise in the marginal propensity to save on the other, contracted aggregate
demand and deflated the price level. 9  Decelerating prices tended to increase real interest
                                                
4 See Zhang (1999).
5 This applause came from, among others, Dornbusch (1999), Chen (1999) and Ni (1999).  One substantial
proponent of the dollar peg was the US government, which feared a devaluation of the RMB would worsen
the bilateral trade imbalance with China and raise protectionist pressures in the build-up to the 2000
election.  Insiders suggest that one reward for the maintenance of the peg was US agreement on China’s
accession to the WTO.
6 See Tyers and Yang (2000), especially their Table 1. Fernald and Babson (2000) estimate that the risk
premium on foreign investment in China rose by 250 basis points between 1996 and 1998.
7 See Table 1 and Figure 1.
8 See Tyers and Yang (2000), and Huang (1999).
9 See Table 1.
5rates and real wage growth, contributing further to the growth slow-down.
In 1998, official statistics report a slowdown of GDP growth from 9.6% in 1996
to 7.8%.10  The PBC attempted to boost investment by lowering administered nominal
interest rates five times over the 1996-1998 period, leaving the defense of the exchange
rate to the management of its considerable foreign reserves.  Yet this failed to offset the
rise in real interest rates associated with price deflation and an associated contraction in
bank lending to the private sector.  Since the monetary stance was de facto restrictive, the
most expansionary policy response to the crisis was an increase in government spending
of around 17% in 1998.11
It has been argued that if the PBC had floated the RMB and allowed it to
depreciate, rather than pegging the currency, some of the damage to exports and FDI
might have been avoided. Tyers and Yang (2000) employed global comparative-static
general equilibrium analysis to simulate the principal shocks to the Chinese economy
during the Asian crisis under fixed and floating currency regimes.  They found that a
depreciation during the crisis could have prevented losses of about 4% of GDP per year,
suggesting that despite its regional benefit the domestic cost of the policy was
considerable.
China has  shown signs of recovery since 1998. Exports surged in 2000, retail
sales accelerated, suggesting increased consumer confidence, and positive consumer
price inflation re-emerged after virtually continuous deflation since October 1997 (see
Table 1).12  It is in this climate that observers of China’s exchange rate policy, including
the IMF, have begun to question the appropriateness of an ongoing peg to the US dollar.
Arguably the biggest obstacle to a more flexible regime for the RMB after 1997
was the fear of sparking another wave of competitive devaluations around the region,
thus worsening the crisis. However, in the current climate, there is much less justification
                                                
10 See Table 1. One possible explanation for the retarded growth is that, given China’s highly regulated
labour market, nominal wages were sticky downwards (explaining the recorded rise in real wages), which
prevented output from expanding at a higher rate (see Tyers and Yang, 2000, who also consider other
possibilities).
11 See Table 1. The increase in government expenditure amounted to a rise of about 1% of GDP in the
1996-98 period.
12 The Asian Wall Street Journal, various issues. Although increased retail sales provide some support for
the hypothesis of increased consumer confidence, the figures should be treated with scepticism, since
policymakers have employed various methods (including extending national holidays throughout 2000) to
boost recorded sales. See AFR, 7-8 October 2000.
6for a US dollar peg, since competitive devaluation fears have subsided since 1998 as the
region has stabilised. The transitions from current account deficit to surplus in Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Korea, necessitated by the crisis, have been
sustained, short term debt has declined since 1997, international reserves have grown,
and since the crisis-induced initial correction, real effective exchange rates are stable or
appreciating.  Some crisis-affected countries have seen revived capital inflows (an
indication of resurfacing investor confidence), and all have experienced higher GDP
growth. 13
While financial and corporate restructuring are still priorities for the crisis-
affected economies, improvement of macroeconomic fundamentals on the one hand and
exchange rate re-alignments on the other have made many currencies less vulnerable to
speculative attacks. At least for the near future, if China adopted a flexible exchange rate
and the RMB subsequently depreciated, it would not probably not affect the region too
adversely.
A corollary of improved regional stability is the opportunity for change that it
affords.  China’s policymakers face an important choice, with serious implications for
macroeconomic policy, now and in the future.  Thus the present exchange rate policy
demands a critical assessment.  We first review some of the key arguments for and
against fixed exchange rates that appear in the literature.
                                                
13 IMF (2000a, 2000b, 2001a).
73.  Exchange Rate Regime Choice: Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Alternatives
There are four basic arguments for maintaining a fixed exchange rate.  First, a peg
to the currency of a low-inflation country can contribute directly to price stability by
fixing the inflation rate for goods traded with that country.  Second, a truly credible peg
can eliminate exchange rate risk and thus avoid risk-associated damage to trade and FDI
flows (which may be discouraged by excessive exchange rate volatility when adequate
hedging instruments are scarce).  Third, if the peg is credible it can provide a nominal
anchor for inflationary expectations by committing the monetary authority to a
transparent policy rule, and thereby curtail the scope for discretion.  Fourth, if one
country together with another country or group of countries constitutes an optimum
currency area (OCA), then by definition a fixed exchange rate or, more drastically, a
currency union, is the appropriate policy for the country concerned.14  As the first two
arguments are associated with the theory of optimum currency areas, they will be treated
under that heading.
The nominal anchor argument is based on the idea that discretionary monetary
policy can have an inflationary bias, and that targeting the currency of a stable, low-
inflation country may prevent individuals from building that bias into their price
expectations, thus contributing to price stability.  The implications of a nominal anchor
policy are clear.  When capital is relatively mobile between countries, a nominal peg to
the US dollar, for example, amounts to targeting the US interest rate, since a widening of
the domestic-foreign interest differential would entail immediate flows on the capital
account, putting pressure on the value of the currency.  In effect, a nominal anchor
‘imports’ monetary discipline and low inflation by requiring that the central bank follow
the monetary policy of another country.
An obvious criticism of the nominal anchor approach is that pegging the domestic
interest rate to that of a foreign country is inappropriate if the shocks to which foreign
monetary policy responds differ from those faced by the pegging country.  By
relinquishing control of the money supply, the authorities jeopardise their ability to
respond to external and domestic shocks with monetary stabilisation policy. 15  Although
                                                
14 See Frankel (2000) and Mishkin (1999).
15 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a).
8standard Mundell-Fleming-type models predict that the efficacy of fiscal policy is
enhanced when the exchange rate is fixed, fiscal policy, subject as it is to lengthy
administrative and transmission lags, as a policy tool may be inferior to monetary policy.
Moreover, a pegged exchange rate will only anchor nominal expectations if it is
credible.  Accountability is a problem for many central banks, particularly in developing
countries, and as Mishkin (1999) notes, fixing the exchange rate may make matters worse
by concealing a key indicator of the stance of monetary policy (the floating nominal
exchange rate).  Although a nominal anchor may be what is needed to reduce inflation in
a country with a record of price instability, obtaining an appropriate commitment
technology remains the real challenge.
Of course, from the currency speculator’s perspective it questionable that any
pegged regime is truly credible.  As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a) observe, when capital
mobility is high, government pledges to foil a large-scale speculative attack are seldom
credible even when there is no danger of a balance of payments crisis.  Speculators know
that the harm caused to domestic investment and bank solvency by interest rate hikes
employed in defence of fixed parity often has political costs severe enough to make the
defence unsustainable.  Thus adopting a pegged currency regime may augment the risk of
speculative attacks on the currency.
A possible antidote to the credibility problem is to adopt a currency board
arrangement, in which the exchange rate is fixed by law and all currency issued is backed
by foreign reserves, thus eliminating the inflation tax as a potential policy tool.  However,
currency boards are unlikely to anchor expectations successfully in countries where the
rule of law is not respected or authority cannot be delegated, since it is the binding legal
discipline imposed upon the monetary authority that makes the commitment credible. 16
           The natural alternative to any kind of fixed regime, of course, is a floating
exchange rate, the classic advantage of which is that it helps insulate real activity from
external shocks by appreciating automatically when the shock is beneficial and
depreciating when it is adverse.  Friedman’s (1953) point that exchange rates adjust much
faster than domestic prices and quantities, making this insulation all the more valuable,
remains a potent one.  In addition, a flexible policy gives the monetary authority the
                                                
16 Frankel (2000); Cottarelli and Giannini (1997).
9independence to respond quickly to domestic and external shocks as required, rather than
tying domestic policy to monetary developments abroad.
Empirical evidence on the performance of nominal anchor currency regimes has
generally been inconclusive, partly reflecting the sheer diversity of experiences, and
partly because of the methodological difficulties that plague econometric analyses of the
issue.17  However most authors agree that fixed and flexible regimes can work in
practice, depending on (a) the strength of policymakers’ commitment to macroeconomic
stability, and (b) the specific characteristics of the country concerned.18  The theory of
optimum currency areas (OCAs) addresses this second issue.  Its focus is on the country
characteristics that would make fixed exchange rates an attractive option. 19
Three commonly cited OCA criteria are: (i) openness (proxied by the trade ratio),
(ii) relative size (in proportion to a trading partner), and (iii) the extent to which output
shocks are correlated.  Openness matters (a) because the inflation rate of a country whose
ratio of trade to real GDP is high may be seriously affected by exchange rate-led
variability in the prices of tradeables, and (b), because exchange rate volatility may
magnify currency risk, damaging trade flows.  Thus there is a rationale for a peg to avoid
the uncertainty of flexible exchange rates.  In addition, it may be appropriate for a small
country that is closely integrated (in terms of trade and capital flows) with a large trading
partner, and faces similar shocks to income, to consider monetary integration with that
partner (either by fixing the exchange rate, or entering into a monetary union).
The discussion so far has focused on a simple ‘fixed’ versus ‘flexible’ dichotomy.
In reality there is a continuum of possible exchange rate regimes.  Apart from currency
unions, currency boards, single-currency pegs and flexible (floating or managed floating)
exchange rates, a variety of intermediate regimes exist, including basket pegs, crawling
pegs and crawling bands.20  Nonetheless, since China, unlike many Latin American
developing countries, does not have a history of persistent high inflation or
                                                
17 See Edwards and Savastano (1999) for a survey.  They argue that definitional problems (the failure to
distinguish between de jure and de facto regimes), and the phenomenon of ‘survival bias’ (that only
successful peggers are included in the ‘fixed exchange rate’ category), have damaged the persuasiveness of
many cross-country studies.
18 See Edwards and Savastano (1999).  This is basically the case put by Little, et al. (1995) for developing
countries (see, in particular, chapter 5).
19 Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969); surveyed by Ishiyama (1975).
20 A taxonomy of these is given in Edwards and Savastano (1999).
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hyperinflation, several regimes (especially the ‘crawling’ varieties designed to engineer a
gradual recovery from very high inflation) are not relevant policy options.  Basket pegs
can be used to target foreign exchange earnings cost, as China did up to the mid-1990s,
and are often considered appropriate for export-oriented Asian nations.21  A full
assessment of the costs and benefits of basket peg regimes is beyond our scope, but it is
worth noting here that insofar as the basket weights are usually kept secret, there is room
for discretion behind the announced policy.  Nonetheless, a genuinely rigid basket peg
may paralyse monetary policy as seriously as a nominal peg. 22
4. China’s Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
Here we place the four arguments discussed in the previous section in the Chinese
context.  A key issue is whether the US dollar peg directly influences price stability in
China.  The answer depends in part on the extent of Sino-US trade, the importance of
China’s other trading partners, and on the specific goods that are traded with particular
partners.  While a stable US dollar exchange rate may stabilise the prices of some
tradeable goods, other bilateral rates could be quite volatile, potentially contributing to
price instability. 23  If trade with the US constituted the bulk of China’s trade, a fixed
exchange rate might exert a powerful stabilising effect on the price level.  It is debatable,
however, that the US is even China’s most important trading partner.  Figures 1 and 2
graph the percentage export and import shares in China’s trade for Japan and the US
(China’s two largest trading partners).  Although the US has recently overtaken Japan in
China’s export market, Japan now dominates as an import supplier; clearly both are close
contenders.  Thus it is not obvious that the ‘direct’ effect augments the case for China’s
peg to the dollar.
The extent to which trade flows can be protected by the risk-reducing properties
of a fixed exchange rate is another difficult question.  There is reason to think that, since
a forward exchange market is not currently permitted in China, the gains could be
substantial, as traders would have no means to insure against foreign exchange risk under
                                                
21 See Benassy-Quere (1996) and Frankel (2000).
22 Ibid.
23 As Zhang and Shen (2000) observe, bilateral nominal exchange rates against the currencies of Japan,
France and Germany (all substantial trading partners) were comparatively volatile during the Asian crisis.
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a floating exchange rate.  Until China liberalises the capital account, this argument for
fixed exchange rates will retain some plausibility.  However, it is usually argued that the
currency risk premium will only be eliminated completely if the exchange rate is
irrevocably fixed.24 As discussed below, China’s currency is not credibly fixed, which
would tend to weaken this argument.
One argument for preserving the peg is that a stable US dollar exchange rate is
valuable to China as a nominal anchor. The earlier discussion, however, would suggest
that the benefit is probably small.  The main reason is that in its present form China’s peg
to the dollar is not credible, in part because it is a de facto peg – there is no associated
public commitment.  The fact that ‘devaluation fears’ have appeared regularly in the
financial press, and that policymakers have had to promise repeatedly that the RMB will
remain ‘stable’, reveals some of the insecurity with which market participants view the
policy. 25  Moreover, as an anchor for inflationary expectations, the policy can hardly be
credible while China’s capital controls extend the authorities space for monetary
discretion.  Even if the authorities made the peg official (instead of quasi-official) by
announcing buying and selling rates for the currency, it is unlikely that this would
improve the policy’s credibility, given (i) the opaque nature of the policymaking process,
(ii) the PBC’s nearly complete subordination to political authority, and (iii) its lack of
financial accountability.
Adopting a currency board in China, even if it were feasible, would not improve
matters.  As Frankel (2000) observes, a currency board must be completely separated
from political authority if it is to be successful.  While the current authoritarian leadership
remains in power, economic agents are unlikely to place much faith in an institution
whose authority in setting monetary policy supposedly overrides that of the Communist
Party itself.26
While the fact that China’s trade is closely integrated with neighbours such as
Japan and Korea might suggest a regional currency union as a natural alternative to the
                                                
24 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a).
25 See AWSJ and Chinaonline (available at URL: http://www.chinaonline.com), in which the views of
market analysts and participants regularly appear.
26 On the question of monetary policy credibility, Cottarelli and Giannini (1997: 16) note that
“policymakers operating under a regime of political dictatorship… might find it hard to precommit
themselves even if they wanted to.”
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US dollar peg, this is unlikely to happen any time soon.  Indeed, as Benassy-Quere
(1996) has noted, Asian nations have for both economic and cultural reasons preferred
US dollar pegs to links with the yen (which being one of the world’s most traded
currencies, is an obvious choice).  The fragility of the Japanese economy over the past
decade (and its continuing decline) is one reason why a yen bloc seems unlikely in the
near future.  In addition, historical grievances relating, in part, to Japan’s wartime
activities would make monetary integration politically impossible for several Asian
nations, including China.
Thus, we see reason to doubt the applicability to the Chinese case of many of the
arguments against exchange rate flexibility considered in Section 2.  Yet a compelling
case for discarding the current policy in favour of a more flexible regime does exist and it
relies on the link between exchange rates and macroeconomic policy.  Although
exchange rates were adjusted to improve the trade balance, until the mid-1990s the stance
of fiscal and monetary policy remained largely insulated from these adjustments, owing
to the non-convertibility of the currency and rigid exchange controls (Huang and Li,
1996).  Current account convertibility was achieved in 1996, but to date the RMB
remains inconvertible on the capital account and subject to various restrictions.27
Although a date has not been set for making the RMB fully convertible, it appears to be
high on the agenda and could well occur within the present decade.28  Already the
authorities are considering opening China’s RMB-priced A-share market (currently
reserved for domestic investors) to overseas institutional investors. Despite the existing
capital controls, unsanctioned capital outflows have risen dramatically since the mid-
1990s, particularly during the Asian crisis. This accords with the common perception that
capital controls tend to become less effective over time.29
                                                
27 China’s capital controls include restrictions on futures trading of the RMB, foreign borrowing by Chinese
enterprises, portfolio investment in China by foreigners and portfolio investment abroad by Chinese
citizens.
28 The PBC has announced that ‘great progress’ would be made towards this end in the next five years
(China Economy News (July 20, 2000) [Chinese Government website], URL: http://www.ce.cei.gov.cn).
29 According to estimates by Tyers and Yang (2000), unsanctioned capital outflows were US$62.9 billion
in 1998, compared to just US$8.4 billion in 1994. More recent EIU estimates (presented in Table 1),
suggest that the trend has not reversed. See  AWSJ  (editorial, 15-17 September 2000) and  Mathieson and
Rojas-Suarez (1993), especially chapter 3.
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Unlike the Latin American economies, where nominal anchor arguments are
frequently applied, the People’s Republic of China does not have a history of
hyperinflation or even sustained high inflation.  Moreover, it has employed monetary
policy successfully to combat inflation when it appeared.  Although the economy has
experienced at least four inflationary episodes since 1978, in each case a combination of
monetary tightening and administrative ‘anti-inflation’ campaigns succeeded in bringing
prices down rapidly, apparently without severely retarding output growth. 30
One crucial economic phenomenon facing China’s policymakers now and in the
near future is the rise of capital mobility.  Another is interest rate liberalisation, which the
PBC has pledged to implement fully over the next three years, starting with lending
rates.31  As capital mobility increases and interest rates are liberalised, preserving the peg
will ultimately mean abandoning any remaining monetary policy independence.  There
would be an argument for doing this if China, like Argentina, had proved incapable of
discretion in its exploitation of monetary independence and was therefore forced to adopt
a currency board.  China’s reform-era macroeconomic record suggests this is not the
case.  Indeed, monetary policy is the most powerful anti-inflation weapon possessed by
the authorities.32 It can be argued that alternative nominal anchor targeting regimes
associated with a floating exchange rate policy are, along with nominal pegs, also likely
to suffer from the credibility problem. But it is clear that this only strengthens the case for
making the choice of currency regime on other criteria, such as the value of monetary
independence and the likely insulation from shocks offered by a floating exchange rate.
As interest rate determination is increasingly left to the market and capital
controls are removed, maintaining a US dollar peg will effectively bind Chinese
monetary policy to the US Federal Reserve’s through interest parity.  Since two countries
as diverse as China and the US are likely to face different domestic and external
macroeconomic shocks, this policy is clearly not in China’s long term interest. Moreover,
as capital mobility increases China’s vulnerability to speculative attacks will rise.  The
commitment to defend the peg may lose all credibility with speculators if domestic or
                                                
30 See Oppers (1997), whose econometric study uses official data. Inaccuracies in reported statistics may
hide the full extent of China’s sacrifice ratio.
31 AWSJ, 6 September 2000. While the interbank rate is floating, at present loan and deposit rates fluctuate
within narrow bands set by the central bank. See Mehran, et al. (1996).
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regional conditions deteriorate again, increasing the likelihood of attacks on the currency,
even if China’s large reserves are sufficient to avoid a balance of payments crisis.33
Finally, the rise of capital mobility will by definition increase the speed and magnitude of
capital flows. If the floating nominal exchange rate is eliminated as a means of insulating
the economy from external shocks, the domestic adjustment required to sustain the
nominal peg must rise in proportion with capital mobility.
The case against maintaining the peg would be less convincing if China’s
(increasingly US dollar denominated) external debt were high, since this would increase
the potential damage a fluctuating US dollar exchange rate could do to the domestic
economy. However, compared to other developing countries, China’s ratio of external
debt to national income has been low during the 1990s. Indeed, China’s 1991-7 average
external debt to GNP ratio of 17.4% is less than half the developing country average of
37.1%, and compares even more favourably to the Asian-crisis affected country average
of 46.9%.34 Hence debt concerns do not weaken the case for a more flexible exchange
rate regime.
                                                                                                                                                
32 Tax policy in China is both ineffective and inflexible (Fung, et. al., 2000).
33 It might be thought that China’s authoritarian government was less constrained by the ‘political costs’ of
defending a peg when capital is mobile, than those of more democratic countries. However, since the
inception of economic reforms, the authorities have staked their political legitimacy on their ability to
improve economic welfare. A perceived downturn in economic conditions is increasingly likely to fuel civil
unrest, which the leadership always views with concern.
34 These figures come from the World Bank, 1999. The ‘crisis countries’ considered were Malaysia,
Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines.
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5.  An Elemental Open Economy Macroeconomic Model
We illustrate the benefits of monetary policy independence as capital mobility
increases by resort to a simple numerical macroeconomic model structured to resemble
China’s economy in 1996.  Since capital immobility was identified in the previous
section as one of the key distortions affecting the path of the Chinese macroeconomy, we
use the model to focus on this issue. The formulation we use is comparative static and of
the Mundell-Fleming type.  In this comparative static world the price level is endogenous
but continuous inflation is ruled out and so there is only one domestic interest rate.  A
length of run is considered over which investment does not alter the current physical
capital stock.
The demand side:
Three markets are represented: that for a single consolidated asset (“bonds”),
which offer a return of r (alternatively called the “capital” or “loanable funds” market),
that for domestic money and that for foreign exchange.  The asset market locates a rate of
return at which investment demand is equated with total (including net foreign) saving
supply.  Investment demand is non-linear, depending on a ratio similar to Tobin’s Q in
which the numerator depends on the net rate of return on installed capital while the
denominator depends on the market interest rate.  Investment therefore depends
positively on the quantity of effective labour employed and negatively on the market
interest rate.35  This relationship takes the form
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Where K is the total stock of physical capital, which is unchanged in the length of run
under consideration.  MPK is the marginal product of physical capital, which varies as the
level of employment changes.  d is the depreciation rate, r is the real interest rate and e is
a positive elasticity.
Saving has three components: ST = S + SG + SNF.  Private saving by Chinese
residents is S = Y – T – C, where taxation, at a constant marginal rate, t, is: T = t + t Y.
Consumption takes the usual reduced form:
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Where the second term represents mainly wealth effects on consumption and cC is the
marginal propensity to consume.  Public saving is SG = T – G, where government
spending, G, is exogenous.  And that part of public saving that is committed to the
domestic economy is SGD = SG - DR = T – G -DR, where DR is the annual increment to
official foreign reserves.  Finally, the net inflow of private saving through the capital
account of the balance of payments needs to be added.  It depends on the interest
premium paid to domestic investors, r – r*, where the foreign interest rate, r*, is
exogenous:
( )*)3( rrbaS FSFSNF -+= .
To clear the loanable funds market, then, we have that
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This is the Hicksian IS condition for the open economy.
The next of the three markets is that for domestic currency.  Here we use a
straightforward real money demand curve, mD = aM + bM Y – cM r and define real money
supply in terms of the nominal money supply, MS, and the GDP deflator, PY.  Together,
these yield the Hicksian LM curve:
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And the nominal money supply is linked to the monetary base via the conventional
money multiplier:
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Where c is here the cash to deposit ratio and r is the reserve to deposit ratio.
The final demand side market is that for foreign exchange.  For this we need to
characterise the balance of payments.  Net inflows on the capital account are
KA = SNF – DR and, ignoring “invisibles”, net inflows in the current account are
CA = X – M.  The balance of payments requires that KA + CA = 0 and so
                                                                                                                                                
35 Current empirical testing of this formulation against investment data for other countries suggests its
performance is better than Q and considerably better than formulations that include the interest rate alone.
Details of this testing are available directly from the authors.
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Where exports and imports depend on the rate at which bundles of home goods can be
exchanged for corresponding bundles of foreign goods, or the real exchange rate, and on
home disposable income:
( )
RXX
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Where eR is the real exchange rate, defined as the number of foreign bundles that can be
exchanged for an equivalent home bundle.  It can be expressed in terms of the nominal
exchange rate as:
*
)10(
P
P
Ee
Y
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Where the nominal exchange rate is foreign currency per unit of domestic currency.  Note
that the Hicksian IS condition for the open economy (equation 4) and the balance of
payments (equation 7) collectively imply the standard aggregate expenditure identity,
Y = C + I + G + X – M.
The supply side:
Real GDP is a Cobb-Douglas function of effective labour use, qL, skill use, SK,
and physical capital use, K.  Only effective labour use is variable in the length of run
considered here and only employment, L, is endogenous.
( ) 1,)11( =++= KSLK KSL KSLY bbbqa bbb .
From equation (11), the marginal product of physical capital is
[ ]( ) LKS LKS
K
Y
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Where the term in square parentheses is constant in our applications.  Firms profit
maximisation sets this equal to the production real wage:
KY
MP
P
W
w ==)13( .
And, finally, the rate of unemployment of ordinary (production) workers is
F
LSF
u K
--
=)14( .
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Where F is the number of both skilled and unskilled workers in the labour force.
Reference values for all endogenous variables are representative of the Chinese national
accounts for 1996 and are reported in Table 2.  The parameter values used are reported in
Table 3.
6. The Effects of Internal and External Shocks
We apply to model to the estimation of the Chinese economy’s response to two
external and two domestic shocks under fixed and floating exchange rates, for different
degrees of capital mobility.  The degree of capital mobility can be varied by adjusting the
parameter bFS, the elasticity of net foreign savings (SNF) to the interest differential r–r*.
The base value of bFS=4.6 (Table 3) was calibrated from the observed change in private
flows on the capital account in the two years 1996-98 and the corresponding change in
the Chinese interest premium.36  We assign twice this value to represent ‘high’ capital
mobility.
The four shocks considered are: (i) an increase in the foreign interest rate r*; (ii) a
fall in the foreign price level P*; (iii) a fall in cC, the marginal propensity to consume; and
(iv) a rise in q, representing a labour-saving technical change.  The first two shocks are
representative of the consequences for China of the Asian crisis, which, as noted above,
involved a rise in the risk premium on investment and a real appreciation relative to most
trading partners.  The third represents a shift in household behaviour toward private
saving, presumably driven by domestic structural reform.  The increase in q is a different
shock altogether but nonetheless an important one for an economy as rapidly growing as
China.  The associated rise in labour productivity might be the result of domestic
innovation or a spillover effect from continued foreign direct investment in China.
The rise in r* is intended to capture the increase in the premium demanded on
investments in China, observed to be 250 basis points (a 40% increase on the reference
level).  Following Tyers and Yang (2000), the fall in P* is set at 3.5%.  To obtain an
estimate for the fall in the marginal propensity to consume, cC, the model is initially
subjected to the 1996-98 Asian crisis shocks together, in a calibration exercise.  For this
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purpose the Asian crisis shocks also include (i) the observed fiscal expansion, of about a
per cent of GDP over the two years, and (ii) the reduction in the rate at which foreign
reserves were being accumulated, from about US$30 billion per year through 1997 to
US$5 billion in 1998.  So the primary shocks in this exercise are to r*, P*, G, and DR.
To complete the calibration, however, instead of holding cC exogenous as a behavioural
parameter and solving for, among other things, an endogenous level of domestic
investment, I, we make I exogenous, impose the observed change in it37, and make cC
endogenous.38  The results from this calibration experiment appear in Table 4.  The
estimated fall in cC is 10%, implying a 40% rise in the marginal propensity to save.  The
technical change shock is more speculative.  For the sake of this analysis a notional 4%
change in q is chosen.
The next step is to subject the model to each of the shocks (to r*, P*, cC, and q)
individually.  This is done four times in each case, where the four solutions represent (i) a
fixed nominal exchange rate with “base” and “high” capital mobility, and (ii) a floating
nominal exchange rate with base and high capital mobility.  The two exchange rate
regimes represent standard closures  When the exchange rate floats, it is assumed that the
authorities target the price level (the GDP deflator, PY), keeping it constant.  When it is
fixed, monetary policy is assumed to be enslaved to the exchange rate target and hence
endogenous.  The change in official foreign reserves, however, remains exogenous so
that the composition of any change in the central bank’s assets can be varied
exogenously.39  In fact, we leave the rate of accumulation of official foreign reserves
unaltered at its pre-crisis level of US$ 30 billion per year in all our experiments.40
                                                                                                                                                
36 Fernald and Babson (1999) estimate the premium to have risen from about 125 to 375 basis points
during this period.  At the same time, from Tyers and Yang (2000) estimate that private flows on the capital
account transited from a net inflow of US$30 billion to a net outflow of US$25 billion.
37 Although total investment did rise slightly in the period 1996-98, all of the increase was in loss-making
state-owned enterprises, while private investment fell.  Since this dichotomy is not represented in the
model, we adopt for our stylised model an investment change of zero.
38 We use the GEMPACK software to solve the model, which is simply a system of m non-linear
simultaneous equations in n unknowns.  n-m variables are specified as exogenous so that the m equations
can be solved for the remaining m endogenous variables.  There is, however, considerable flexibility about
the particular variables that are chosen to be made exogenous and endogenous.  Here we make a simple
switch.
39 In this comparative static model we compare two equilibria and so cannot track the precise annual
change in the central bank’s assets.  We know, however, that the change in the monetary base, MB, is the
sum of the corresponding changes in domestic credit (holdings of domestic government bonds), DC, and
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In each closure the supply side variables F, K and SK are exogenous, as are the
consumption parameters, including the marginal propensity to consume, cC, the tax
parameters t and t, government spending, G, (as indicated above) the change in reserves,
DR, and the money multiplier parameters, r and c.  Also, in all six solutions, it is assumed
the nominal wage, W, is fixed over the length of run considered.41  The remaining
variables are either differently classified in the fixed and flexible exchange rate closures
or, where they remain exogenous, they are subjected to shocks.
Closure 1: Fixed exchange rate
Exogenous: E, P*, r*, q, cC
Endogenous: PY, Y, I, u, MS, MB, X, M, eR
Closure 2: Flexible exchange rates
Exogenous: PY, P*, r*, q, cC
Endogenous: Y, I, u, MS, MB, X, M, E, eR
Shocks (for low, reference and high capital mobility:  bFS= 2.3, 4.6, 9.2):
Change in r* : +40%
Change in P* : -3.5%
Change in cC : -9.5%
Change in q  :  +4%
As indicated earlier, each shock is imposed four times (two for each exchange rate
regime), resulting in a total of 16 simulations.
                                                                                                                                                
foreign reserves (holdings of foreign bonds), R.  Or that DMB = DDC + DR .  Any endogenous change in MB,
combined with an exogenous change in R therefore implies a particular pattern of sterilisation through
DDC, which is assumed to be achieved through domestic open market operations.
40 It might be argued that salting away 3% of GDP overseas each year represented particularly conservative
behaviour by the government and that this acted to suppress the equilibrium exchange rate.  This issue is
taken up by Bu and Tyers (2000).
41 Even though China’s labour markets are highly regulated by the standards of most developing countries,
this is a strong assumption that one would expect to lead to some overestimation of real effects.
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Experiment 1:  Rise in r*
When the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the rise in r* stimulates a private
outflow on the capital account.  To keep the nominal exchange rate from appreciating, the
authorities must lower the money supply, raising the interest rate.  The associated
financial contraction results in an excess of aggregate supply over demand and a lower
price level.  When the nominal wage is rigid this raises the real wage, reducing GDP and
income.  The increased private outflow on the capital account causes a depreciation of the
real exchange rate.  Exports rise and imports fall.  These changes are clear from the
numerical results in Table 5.
As capital mobility increases the effect of this external shock magnifies the
change in private flows on the capital account (the proportional contraction in net private
inflow, SNF, is larger by half with the transition to high mobility), increasing the required
adjustment in other variables.  The deflation that results under the fixed exchange rate
regime is larger the greater is capital mobility, the percentage decline almost doubling in
the transition to the “high mobility” cases.  Accordingly, the real depreciation is enlarged
with greater mobility and so the trade balance improves more substantially the more
mobile is capital.  This only partially offsets the effects of the deflation on output and
employment, however.  The output contraction also almost doubles with the transition to
high capital mobility.
Were the exchange rate sufficiently flexible to allow independent monetary
policy, however, it would be possible to avoid the real wage changes that harm
employment and output by targeting the price level.  In this case, much of the adjustment
is borne by variations in the nominal and real exchange rates, which also enlarge by half
with the transition to high capital mobility.  Constant aggregate income means that
consumption is somewhat insulated from the shock, despite a slightly larger increase in
the domestic rate of return r, for all capital mobility settings.  The trade balance improves
by slightly less than it would with a fixed exchange rate, for all capital mobility settings,
because despite a greater fall in the real exchange rate (boosting exports and contracting
imports), constant income ensures that the effect on imports is smaller.
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Experiment 2: Fall in P*
Were the exchange rate floating, the fall in P* would have no real effects in our
simple model.  It would simply cause an offsetting nominal depreciation, leaving the
domestic price level unchanged.42  In the fixed exchange rate world the central bank
resists this tendency to depreciate with monetary tightening.  This reduces the home price
level, which has two consequences.  First, it ensures that, by definition (equation 10)
there is a real appreciation.  Second, it is contractionary, raising the home real wage and
lowering output and employment.  The real contraction lowers private saving, which
would normally cause the domestic interest rate to rise, but it also lowers the real return
on installed capital.  In this particular case the latter effect shifts investment demand
sufficiently to cause the home rate of return to fall slightly. 43  This causes a slight
diminution of private net inflows on the capital account.  On the current account this is
balanced by a shift toward surplus.  Here, again, there are two offseting effects.  By itself,
the real appreciation tends to cause a deterioration in the current account, but in this case
the dominant effect is a reduction in imports due to the real income contraction.  As
indicated in Table 6, because the changes in flows on the balance of payments are
comparatively small in this case, the preceding causal sequence is comparatively
insensitive to the level of capital mobility.
Experiment 3: Autonomous savings increase (fall in cC)
An autonomous fall in the marginal propensity to consume increases total saving
and reduces the equilibrium rate of return in the market for “bonds”, as indicated in Table
7.  Alternatively, it reduces aggregate demand relative to supply, lowering both the
domestic interest rate, the price level.  The deflation raises the real wage, which reduces
employment and aggregate output.  The fall in r-r* sparks a substantial capital outflow.
Under a fixed exchange rate policy the central bank contracts the money supply to
prevent a nominal depreciation, but the net effect on r remains negative.  As capital
                                                
42 This result depends on the assumption that the GDP deflator always indicates the domestic price level.
Since this remains unchanged there is no change in the real production wage and hence no real effects.  If,
however, the labour market rigidity took the form of rigid real take-home pay, the consumer price index
would become important.
43 In this comparative static model, the home rate of return is the equivalent of the long term borrowing
rate.  The monetary contraction would be expected to raise the short term rate.
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mobility rises, the outflow on the capital account increases and the total supply of savings
to finance domestic investment decreases.  The fall in the domestic rate of return is
mitigated, magnifying the negative effect on consumption.  Consequently the effects on
income, employment and the price level become increasingly negative as capital becomes
more mobile.  Of course the corollary to the shift in the capital account toward deficit is a
shift toward surplus in the current account, by a magnitude that enlarges with capital
mobility.
Since a flexible exchange rate makes it possible for the authorities to stabilise the
price level, it completely insulates income and employment from the effects of this
shock.  Expansionary monetary policy lowers r even further, expanding investment
demand, while the nominal depreciation allows net exports to expand by a greater amount
than they do in the fixed exchange rate case.  Together, these two effects completely
offset the effect of the fall in consumption, for all three levels of capital mobility.
Experiment 4: Labour-saving technical change (rise in q)
A rise in the productivity of labour increases aggregate supply relative to demand,
which increases output and lowers the price level when the nominal wage is fixed.  The
lower price level expands the real money supply, which would otherwise tend to reduce
the interest rate, but in this case a higher q increases the marginal product of installed
capital and boosts investment demand, ensuring that the net effect on the domestic rate of
return is positive.  This, in turn, raises net inflows on the capital account.  As indicated in
Table 8, when the nominal exchange rate is fixed, this requires an easing of monetary
policy to prevent a nominal appreciation.  Still the net effect on the domestic rate of
return remains positive.
The net fall in the price level lowers the real exchange rate, but rising income
boosts imports sufficiently to worsen the trade balance.  As capital mobility rises, net
exports tend to fall, since the changes in exports and imports rise and fall respectively.
Overall, the effect of increased capital mobility is less unattractive in this scenario.
Indeed, investment, consumption and employment all improve slightly as capital mobility
increases.
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Were the nominal exchange rate flexible, however, the improvement in income
and employment more than doubles, since the focus of monetary policy on the price level
ensures that the real wage does not rise.  The real exchange rate falls by a greater amount
than it does under a fixed exchange rate, and the trade balance worsens progressively the
greater is capital mobility, but the net effect on exports remains positive.
7. Extensions
The model simulated in the previous section helps consolidate some key intuitions
about Chinese exchange rate policy; specifically the ‘insulation’ property of flexible
exchange rates, and the idea that increased capital mobility should magnify the volatility
in prices and income caused by a peg to the dollar.  The model has clear drawbacks,
however.  In particular, since its comparative static structure ignores the dynamic and
expectational aspects of the economy, such as: (a), the effect of price level changes on
inflation expectations and hence on the real interest rate, and (b), potential ‘overshooting’
effects that might, by increasing exchange rate volatility, make a flexible regime less
attractive.  Finally, the assumption of nominal wage rigidity is extreme, even for China’s
regulated economy, as wages in China’s dynamic private sector are more flexible than in
the highly regulated state sector.
A more complete analysis would specify a dynamic general equilibrium model of
the Chinese economy, in which the stance of exchange rate policy and the degree of
capital mobility could be embedded.  Although models of this sort are unknown in the
Chinese economy literature, recent developments in international macroeconomics
suggest they may constitute a fruitful topic for future research.  In particular, the ‘New
Open Economy Macroeconomic Models’  developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995b,
1998, 2000) and Devereux and Engel (1998) show much promise as a means of capturing
the intuitions of traditional Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch approaches in microfounded
sticky-price or sticky-wage DGE models.44  A key advantage of these models is that, by
describing the behaviour of representative agents through explicit utility and profit
maximisation problems, they make formal welfare analysis possible.  A weakness of the
comparative-static approach used in the previous section is that it is only relevant for
                                                
44 See Lane (1999) for a survey.
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short-run analysis.  By applying the intertemporal approach to the Chinese economy,
much could be learnt about the long-run effects of various macroeconomic shocks under
alternative currency regimes.  In a stochastic context, where considerations of currency
risk are appropriate, the insurance property of China’s fixed exchange rate could also be
meaningfully assessed.45
8. Conclusion
To summarise, there is a case for a more flexible exchange rate policy in China.
As China’s capital markets become globally integrated, a pegged exchange rate will: (i)
erode the independence of monetary policy, (ii), magnify variation in prices and output,
and (iii) increase the risk of speculative attacks on the currency under adverse regional or
domestic conditions.  China’s peg to the dollar is of questionable value in the post-crisis
world, where regional conditions have stabilised, implying that competitive devaluation
fears are no longer as severe as they were.  It has been argued here that the peg may also
have limited value as a nominal anchor for domestic expectations.
Experiments conducted using a simple comparative-static macroeconomic model
confirm the suspicion that monetary policy could be put to good use in minimising price
and output volatility when the economy is subjected to adverse external and internal
shocks.  When capital mobility rises, pegging the currency simply increases that
volatility.  This sensitivity to the level of capital mobility is strongest when the shocks are
to the interest premium on Chinese investment, as during the Asian financial crisis, and to
private savings behaviour, as observed in association with the domestic reform process.
While the elemental model used here supports the idea that in China’s case a
flexible exchange rate regime would be preferable to a pegged regime, it is not clear that
a more complicated model, augmented to incorporate dynamics and expectational effects,
would produce the same result.  In particular, the insurance effect of a fixed exchange
rate is not adequately addressed in the framework employed here.  A more flexible
regime could prove harmful to trade and direct investment flows.  While the case for a
                                                
45 See Engel (1999) for a discussion of the foreign exchange risk premium in these models. The caveat, of
course, is that until China develops a forward exchange rate the insights of this literature, which assumes
that agents can hedge against currency risk, will have to be modified.
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flexible renminbi should be qualified by these considerations, it is clear that it must be
taken seriously by policymakers as they continue to plan China’s economic transition.
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Table 1: Economic Indicators, 1992-2000
Year Capital
flight
US$ bn
CPI growth
% per year
Real GDP
growth
% per year
FDI
US$ bn
Export
growth
% per year
Government
spending
Bn Yuan
1992 -56.8 6.4 14.2 11.2 18.32 374
1993 -19.9 14.7 13.5 27.5 7.95 464
1994 -20.4 24.1 12.6 33.8 31.88 579
1995 -32.3 17.1 10.5 35.8 22.95 682
1996 -30.5 8.3 9.6 40.2 1.53 794
1997 -63.5 2.8 8.8 44.2 21.01 923
1998 -63.2 -0.8 7.8 43.8 0.56 1080
1999 -43.0 -1.3 7.2 38.8 6.05 1314
2000 -50.2 0.3 7.8 - 27.85 -
Source: Capital flight data (net US$bn) are estimates from The Economist Intelligence Unit (acquired from
Datastream). CPI growth, FDI (US$bn), export growth and government spending (billion yuan) are all from
IMF International Financial Statistics.
Table 2:  Reference values of key model variables:
Variable Base
value,
US$ bn
Variable Base
value
GDP, Y 1000 Real interest rate, r 7.00 %
Consumption, C 500 Foreign int. rate, r* 6.25 %
Investment, I 370 Domestic prices, P 1.0
Govt. spending, G 130 Foreign prices, P* 1.0
Exports, X 160 Nom. Ex. Rate, E 1.0
Imports, M 160 Real ex. Rate, eR 1.0
Tax, T 120
Money supply, MS 470
Monetary base, MB 135
Capital stock, K 2000
Skill, SK 100
Labour use, L 375
Labour force, F 500
Net for. saving, SNF 30
Reserve Accum., DR 30
Source: Indicative values structured to resemble national accounts data for 1996.  See Tyers (2000).
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Table 3:  Reference Values of Key Parameters
Parameter Value
Shares of value added:
          variable labour, bL 0.45
          skill, bS 0.20
          physical capital, bK 0.35
Elasticity of real money demand to:
          income, Y 0.5
          interest rate, r 0.1
Marginal tax rate t 0.2
Marginal propensity to consume, cC 0.8
Response of consumption to the interest rate, r 0.1
Money multiplier, MS/Mb 3.5
Elasticity of imports, M, to the real exchange rate, eR 2.0
Marginal propensity to import, cM 0.3
Elasticity of exports, X, to the real exchange rate, eR 1.5
Elasticity of net foreign saving, SNF, to the interest rate, r 4.6
Elasticity of proportional investment, (K+I)/K to (1+r), -e -3.0
Source: Indicative estimates only, drawn from other country studies.  See Tyers (2000).
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Table 4: Asian Crisis Shocks: Calibrating the change in saving behaviour
(All values in US$ bn)
Variable: Per cent
change
Value
before
Value
after
Differe
nce
Expenditures on GDP:
          GDP, Y -5.4 1000 946 -54
          Consumption, C -18.9 500 406 -94
          Investment, I 0.0 370 370 0
          Government spending, G 7.7 130 140 10
          Exports, X 4.7 160 168 8
          Imports, M -14.4 160 137 -23
Balance of payments:
          Private net inflow, SNF -185 30 -25 -55
          Change in official reserves, DR -83 30 5 -25
          Current account surplus, X-M 0 31 31
Saving:
          Marginal propensity to consume, cC -9.6 0.80 0.72 -0.08
          Disposable income, YD -9.0 120 109 -11
          Tax revenue, T 207.8 -10 -31 -21
          Government saving, T-G -10.3 -40 -36 4
          Govt saving at home, T-G-DR 13.5 380 431 51
          Domestic private saving, S
Nominal money supply: -8.6 135 123 -12
          Monetary base, B -8.6 470 429 -41
          Nominal money supply, MS
Interest rate:
          Return on installed capital, MPK-d -12.6 0.07 0.07 -0.01
          Home interest rate, r -4.5 0.07 0.07 0.00
          Foreign interest rate, r* 40.0 0.06 0.09 0.02
Exchange rate:
          Real exchange rate, eR 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
          Nominal exchange rate, E -3.2 1.0 1.0 0.0
Supply side:
          Real wage, w=W/P 7.0 1.20 1.28 0.08
          Nominal wage, W 0.0 1.20 1.20 0.00
          Tech factor, q 0.0 1.00 1.00 0.00
          Employment, L -11.6 375 332 -43
          Unemployment rate, u 173 0.05 0.14 0.09
Price level:
          Home price level, P -6.5 1.00 0.93 -0.07
          Foreign price level , P* -3.5 1.00 0.96 -0.04
a  The exogenous shocks are to the foreign price level, P*, the foreign interest rate, r*, government
spending, G, and the change in foreign reserves, DR.  The nominal exchange rate, E , is held fixed to reflect
the fixed exchange rate policy.  The nominal wage, W, is held fixed to represent labour market rigidity and
domestic investment, I, is held constant by observation (this is the variable that is swapped from
endogenous to exogenous in order to calibrate the change in the marginal propensity to consume).
Source: Simulations using the model discussed in the text.
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Table 5:  Simulated effects of a rise in the foreign interest rate, r*
(Per cent change unless otherwise indicated)
Fixed exchange rate Flexible exchange
rate
Variable:
Base
capital
mobility
High
capital
mobility
Base
capital
mobility
High
capital
mobility
Expenditures on GDP:
          GDP, Y -4.3 -7.2 0.0 0.0
          Consumption, C -7.1 -11.9 -1.4 -2.4
          Investment, I -13.0 -21.7 -8.8 -14.6
          Government spending, G 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Exports, X 7.8 13.0 10.5 17.5
          Imports, M -16.8 -28.1 -14.0 -23.3
Balance of payments:
          Private net inflow, SNF -131 -219 -130 -217
          Change in official reserves, DR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Current acc. surplusa, D(X-M), US$bn 39.4 65.7 39.2 65.3
Money supply  and interest rate:
          Nominal money supply, MS -7.9 -13.0 -0.7 -1.2
          Home interest rate, r 6.9 11.6 7.0 11.8
Exchange rate:
          Real exchange rate, eR -5.2 -8.7 -7.0 -11.7
          Nominal exchange rate, E 0.0 0.0 -7.0 -11.7
Supply side:
          Real wage, w=W/P 5.5 9.5 0.0 0.0
          Nominal wage, W 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Unemployment rate, u 138 228 0.0 0.0
Price level:
          Home price level, P -5.2 -8.7 0.0 0.0
a  This is the US$ change in the current account surplus due to the tabulated shock.
Source: Simulations using the model discussed in the text.
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Table 6:  Simulated effects of a fall in the foreign price level, P*
(Per cent change unless otherwise indicated)
Fixed exchange rate Flexible exchange
rate
Variable:
Base
capital
mobility
High
capital
mobility
Base
capital
mobility
High
capital
mobility
Expenditures on GDP:
          GDP, Y -2.2 -2.2 0.0 0.0
          Consumption, C -2.9 -2.9 0.0 0.0
          Investment, I -2.2 -2.2 0.0 0.0
          Government spending, G 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Exports, X -1.4 -1.3 0.0 0.0
          Imports, M -1.4 -1.5 0.0 0.0
Balance of payments:
          Private net inflow, SNF -0.4 -0.6 0.0 0.0
          Change in official reserves, DR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Current acc. surplusa, D(X-M), US$bn 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
Money supply  and interest rate:
          Nominal money supply, MS -3.7 -3.7 0.0 0.0
          Home interest rate, r -0.08 -0.07 0.0 0.0
Exchange rate:
          Real exchange rate, eR 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0
          Nominal exchange rate, E 0.0 0.0 -3.5 -3.5
Supply side:
          Real wage, w=W/P 2.7 2.7 0.0 0.0
          Nominal wage, W 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Unemployment rate, u 71 71 0.0 0.0
Price level:
          Home price level, P -2.6 -2.6 0.0 0.0
a  This is the US$ change in the current account surplus due to the tabulated shock.
Source: Simulations using the model discussed in the text.
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Table 7:  Simulated Effects of a Fall in cC
(Per cent change unless otherwise indicated)
Fixed exchange rate Flexible exchange
rate
Variable:
Base
capital
mobility
High
capital
mobility
Base
capital
mobility
High
capital
mobility
Expenditures on GDP:
          GDP, Y -1.4 -2.4 0.0 0.0
          Consumption, C -13.8 -15.2 -12.0 -12.3
          Investment, I 10.5 7.5 12.1 10.1
          Government spending, G 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Exports, X 2.6 4.3 3.5 5.9
          Imports, M -5.6 -9.3 -4.7 -7.8
Balance of payments:
          Private net inflow, SNF -43.4 -72.3 -43.6 -73.1
          Change in official reserves, DR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Current acc. surplusa, D(X-M), US$bn 13.0 21.1 13.1 21.9
Money supply  and interest rate:
          Nominal money supply, MS -1.5 -3.3 1.0 0.8
          Home interest rate, r -9.4 -7.9 -9.5 -7.9
Exchange rate:
          Real exchange rate, eR -1.7 -2.9 -2.3 -3.9
          Nominal exchange rate, E 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -3.9
Supply side:
          Real wage, w=W/P 1.8 3.0 0.0 0.0
          Nominal wage, W 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Unemployment rate, u 46.6 77.3 0.0 0.0
Price level:
          Home price level, P -1.7 -2.9 0.0 0.0
a  This is the US$ change in the current account surplus due to the tabulated shock.
Source: Simulations using the model discussed in the text.
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Table 8:  Simulated Effects of a Rise in q
(Per cent change unless otherwise indicated)
Fixed exchange rate Flexible exchange
rate
Variable:
Base
capital
mobility
High
capital
mobility
Base
capital
mobility
High
capital
mobility
Expenditures on GDP:
          GDP, Y 2.4 2.4 3.3 3.3
          Consumption, C 3.2 3.2 4.3 4.3
          Investment, I 2.4 2.4 3.3 3.3
          Government spending, G 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Exports, X 1.5 1.5 2.1 2.0
          Imports, M 1.6 1.6 2.2 2.2
Balance of payments:
          Private net inflow, SNF 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.9
          Change in official reserves, DR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Current acc. surplusa, D(X-M), US$bn -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
Money supply  and interest rate:
          Nominal money supply, MS 0.2 0.2 1.6 1.6
          Home interest rate, r 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Exchange rate:
          Real exchange rate, eR -1.0 -1.0 -1.4 -1.4
          Nominal exchange rate, E 0.0 0.0 -1.4 -1.4
Supply side:
          Real wage, w=W/P 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
          Nominal wage, W 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
          Unemployment rate, u -20.6 -20.9 -48.9 -48.9
Price level:
          Home price level, P -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0
a  This is the US$ change in the current account surplus due to the tabulated shock.
Source: Simulations using the model discussed in the text.
